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The Idea of Hindu Law 
Purushottama Bilimoria 
Deakin University, University of California (Berkeley), Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies 
Hindu Law has the oldest pedigree of any known system of jurisprudence, and even now it shows no sign of 
decrepitude (J. D. Mayne).1 
The genealogy of ‘Hindu law’ is a complicated matter itself. Hindu law so understood in modern times 
is arguably an heir to the bifurcated system instigated during the British colonial period in the form of 
Anglo–Hindu law that preserved basically family law and certain other ‘private’, i.e. community, 
mores which presumably governed the Hindus. Was there any awareness on the part of the colonial 
masters that the parent law from which personal law of the Hindus had been split off could have had a 
longer and more substantive history? Apparently there was. The term ‘Hindu law’ was, in Davis’ 
words, ‘coined by British Orientalists and administrators in the later eighteenth century to refer to the 
general system of law prevailing among the Hindu majority before the British colonial encroachments, 
as opposed to the “Muhammadan law” of India’s politically dominant Mughal dynasty’.2 Hindu legal 
history accordingly comprises three general periods: classical Hindu law (ca 500 BCE–1772 CE), 
Anglo–Hindu law (1772–1947) and modern Hindu law (1947–present).3 For the purposes of the 
present paper, Hindu law will be taken to fall within the pre-colonial, that is, classical or traditional, 
period and the discussion here will be confined to gaining an understanding of what this idea of Hindu 
law might look like today and whether it is deserving of the descriptor ‘law’ as law is understood in the 
modern and postmodern era. Is there such a thing as Hindu law? Or might we need to introduce a 
broader nuance, marked by difference, and a strongly sustainable variant to the currently privileged 
concept of ‘law’: thus Hindu law. We shall begin without the latter presumption but argue toward its 
desirability. 
In pre-colonial traditional India, what could be referred to as the legal process of the Hindus is said 
to have been functioning in much the same way as it had done for millennia but, unlike post-
Enlightenment European law, it was not a centralised institutional apparatus, formulated and 
administered by a ‘state’ independently of spiritual or religious and cultural practices. Rather, law was 
a concept inclusive of tradition, custom and religion, and represented a transcendental obedience to 
morality. Hindus have never been governed by a central church structure and hierarchy as Christians 
and Muslims have in their respective histories, or by a Pope who ‘lays down the law’ for all Hindus. 
Galanter observed that in ‘traditional India, many groups (castes, guilds, villages, sects) enjoyed a 
broad sphere of legal autonomy, and where disputes involving them came before public authorities, the 
latter were obliged to apply the rules of that group. That is, the groups generated and carried their own 
law and enjoyed some assurance that it would be applied to them.’4 There is some truth perhaps to this 
                                                
1. John D. Mayne, Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage (Madras: Higginbotham, 1878), v. 
2. Donald Davis, Jr, ‘Traditional Hindu Law in the Guise of “Postmodernism”: A Review Article’, Review of 
Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity by Werner F. Menski, Michigan Journal of International Law, 25, 
no. 3 (2004): 735–49. Dieter Conrad likewise notes: ‘British courts, by systematically referring to dharmaśāstras 
as law books and further by introducing their own techniques of binding judicial precedent, virtually created a 
coherent structure of common Hindu law where before there had been ‘a congeries of legally self-sufficient 
communities and sects.’ Conrad, ‘The Personal Law Question and Hindu Nationalism’, in Representing Hinduism: 
The Construction of Religious Tradition and National Identity, ed. Vasudha Dalmia & H. von Stietencron (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), 306–37. 
3. I would have thought 1950 with the adoption of the Constitution, but I defer to Davis and Menski on this.  
4. Marc Galanter, Law and Society in Modern India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989, 1992), 237; however, 
Galanter has been criticised, by Menski among others, for seeing a gap, in his overall thesis, between law and 
society, between legal system and its historical rootedness in a society, and its possible incongruence with its 
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generalisation, but it does not tell us from where the groups obtained the legal principles that 
determined the rules, and how did they evolve new laws? In other words, what has been the source of 
law for the Hindus, whether in disparate groups or collectively? 
The common belief is that traditional (and for that matter its heir in the colonial and modern 
personal law system) Hindu law is informed by three originary sources. The first of these is Śruti (or 
shruti), the ‘divinely revealed’ or, better, ‘heard word’ (being apaurus.eya or ‘authorless’5) which 
forms the central Vedic corpus. The Vedas (or Veda) are a collection of ritual and liturgical hymns, 
sam. hitās, ceremonial guides, brāhman. as, forest-treatises, Āran. yakas and philosophical expositions, 
Upanis.ads. These are collated under four canons: Ṛgveda, Sāma-veda, Atharva-veda and Yajur-veda. 
They can be dated anywhere between 1500 BCE to 600 BCE. One of the preeminent themes that 
motivates much of Vedic thinking is the consideration of a higher cosmic order (r.ta, superseded later 
by the term dharma), or transcendence, that regulates the universe and provides the basis for the 
growth, flourishing and sustenance of all the worlds—be that of the gods, human beings, animals and 
eco-formations. So conceived, r.ta could be seen as ‘law’—the law of the natural world and of human 
beings. Hence, Satyajeet A. Desai in his reworking of Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law emphasises that 
for the ancient Hindu his ‘law was revelation, immutable and eternal . . . Shruti [as Vedas] was the 
fountainhead of his law’.6 
Next is smr
˚
̥ti (smr. ̥ti), the immemorialised or ‘memorised’ tradition7—inclusive of the commentaries 
and digests (nibandhas)—which as a corpus is transmitted through the sages and scribes and as such 
forms Hinduism’s literary and religious canonical texts with implications for social and cultural, also 
political, practices.8 The smr.ti texts comprise, in particular, the six Vedān. gas (the auxiliary sciences in 
the Vedas), the epics of the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana, the Dharmasūtras and Dharmaśāstras (or 
Smr.tiśāstras), Arthasaśāstras, the Purān. as and kāvya or poetical literature, which regulate Hindu 
social order. The third source is the unwritten sadācāra, meaning ‘good conduct of the conscientious 
(ātmatust.ī)’, or the exemplary behavior of those who understand and execute in their own lives the 
moral–legal teachings of the śāstras. Sādācara only marginally includes the customs and practices of 
the people.9 Śāstras are, in Pollock’s words, ‘cultural grammars’ that both reflect and regulate practice 
(prayoga).10 
Now, these three foundational elements—scriptural authority, tradition, ‘exemplary conduct’ and 
only marginally custom—are said to underwrite the central principle of Hindu life, known as dharma 
(righteous order and obligations).11 And it is further added that the legendary ‘lawgivers’, such as 
Manu and, after him, Yājñavalkya, formalised and codified the laws in Manusmr.ti (also known as 
Manusamhitā or Mānava-dharmaśāstra), and in Yājñavalkyasmr.ti (third–fourth centuries CE) and the 
                                                                                                                                      
social and cultural settings, lacking as it may also in an integrated purposiveness. See Davis, ‘Traditional Hindu 
Law’, n 7.  
5. It is the scholastic system of the Mīmām. sā that has gone to the greatest length to preserve the epistemological 
and moral autonomy of the Vedas, bereft of a supreme transcendent authority. See P. Bilimoria, ‘The Idea of 
Authorless Revelation’, in Indian Philosophy of Religion, ed. Roy W. Perrett (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff/Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1989), 143–66.  
6. Satyajeet A. Desai, ed., Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law, 17th edn (New Delhi: Butterworths, 1998), 3. 
7. Flavia Agnes describes the smr
˚
̥ti as ‘the memorised word’, in her magnum opus Women and Law in India / 
with an introduction (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 12, while Robert Lingat’s seminal work The 
Classical Law of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7–8, simply describes smr
˚
̥ti (or smr.ti) as 
‘tradition’. 
8. A. M. Bhattacharjee, Hindu Law and Constitution (Delhi: Eastern Law House, 1994) cites several modern 
scholars and writers on Hindu Law who appear to be committed to this characterisation, notably Mulla’s 
Principles, 77; Mayne, Treatise, 19. Werner F. Menski also takes them and a few others to task on this score. And 
Asaf A. A. Fyzee repeats the stereotype, introducing God in connection with dharma for the Hindus, in Outlines of 
Muhammadan Law, 4th edn (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 15. 
9. Mulla for his part lists ‘Custom’ as the third source; Mayne offers (1) the smr.ti ‘or the Dharmaśāstras’; (2) 
Commentaries and Digests, and (3) Custom.  
10. Sheldon Pollock, ‘Playing by the Rules: Śāstras and Sanskrit Literature’, in The Śāstric Tradition in Indian 
Arts, ed. A. L. Dallapiccola et al. (Weisbaden: Steiner, 1989), 301–12, 301. 
11. See also Lingat, Classical Law, 7–8. Derrett includes śruti and smr.ti under Dharmaśāstras, which is the only 
category he otherwise notes as the sources of ‘Anglo–Hindu Law’. Paras Diwan lists (1) śruti, (2) smr.ti (3) Digests 
and Commentaries and (4) Custom, whereas Tahir Mahmood describes Hindu Law as ‘that body of law in its 
entirety which originated from religious scriptures of various indigenous communities of this century’. All cited in 
Bhattacharjee, Hindu Law, 13. There are thus permutations and variations to the same theme. 
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various nibhandas, which gradually became the dominant sources of Hindu law and governance of all 
aspects of Hindu life under the patronage of Brahmins and ks.atriya rulers in cohort. Manu himself 
endorsed the three foundational sources, adding ‘conscience’ as the fourth source, as this verse (12) 
states: 
The four marks of dharma, they say, are (1) the Vedas, (2) the smr.ti (tradition) (3) the conduct of good people 
and (4) what is pleasing to oneself (Vedāh.  smr.ti⎥ sadācāra⎥ svasya ca priyamātmāna); (the good people know 
the Veda); ‘Scriptures’ should be recognised as Veda, smr.ti and dharmaśāstras. These two (as the highest 
authority) should never be called into question.12 
The view represented above, however, is probably a product of medieval scholasticism and is 
contestable. It has recently come under severe criticism and qualification by scholars of Hindu legal 
history and certain Indian feminist writers also, as we shall discuss in developing an understanding of 
the complexity and variegated pastiche that is often characterised to be a homogenous or univocal 
structure under the rubric of Hindu law. 
There are doubtless a good number of scholars who have written on Hindu law—Mulla, J. D. Mayne, 
Paras Diwan, J. Duncan M. Derrett, P. V. Kane, Robert Lingat, A. M. Bhattacharjee, Donald Davis, Jr, 
Werner F. Menski. Menski’s work is interesting,13  as he challenges several distortions in the 
conceptualisation of Hindu law in modernist (colonial, Western and post-colonial) representations in 
respect of the origins and the development of the formalist legal system, that has as its background 
model the legal positivism and European (beginning with Roman) system of the ‘rule of law’, among 
other legalistic presuppositions, culminating in the Code Napoleon and (British) Black Letter Law. 
While we may not share all the assertions and scholastic reworking that Menski offers, for the purposes 
of this paper we find Menski’s work to be instructive. In many ways Menski reinforces what Indian 
moral philosophers have been arguing for some time, namely that Hindu (and, for that matter, much of 
Indian) law cannot be separated from morality and culture-specific ethics in the broader sense of 
practices and social realities or relativities on the ground.14 To do so is to impose the template of a 
much later development of the idea of ‘law’—from the natural law tradition and the Roman secular 
version15—which is anathema and a misnomer that is best discarded in the interest of a more nuanced 
understanding and appreciation of whatever it is that we in the modern times—and Menski certainly 
does for heuristic reasons—retain the generic nomenclature ‘Hindu law’. 
Menski has his critics too, such as Donald R. Davis, Jr, who argues that Menski goes too far in 
sifting out the scholastic tradition from the dialectical impact on customary laws, both as a historical 
fact and as a hermeneutical reality, for otherwise what would be the essential ‘Hindu-ness’ of 
customary laws the Dharmaśāstras allegedly textualised?16 This is a pertinent question. One might 
respond that, well, ‘Hindu-ness’ as a trope might itself be a suspect candidate here and, conversely, the 
suggestion that the formation—and not just the reiteration or reformulation—of law was supervenient 
upon the active agency of the textual or scholastic tradition. As we shall see, Kaut.ilya could talk about 
dharma (better predicated as svadharma) as a virtuous and normative order of governance, or simply a 
                                                
12. II.10–12, Manu’s Code of Law: A Critical Edition and Translation of the Mānava-Dharmaśāstras, trans. 
Patrick Olivelle (Oxford University Press, 2005), 94, 405. II.12 is to be read in conjunction with surrounding 
verses II.6–II.13. 
13. Werner F. Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
14. This position is discussed in relation to general theory of morality or ethics in the Indian context within 
which the practices of law, jurisprudence as legal hermeneutics, the role of precedence, natural law disquisitions 
and judicial decision making were included: see P. Bilimoria, Renuka Sharma and J. Prabhu, eds, Indian Ethics, 
Vol. 1: Classical and Contemporary Challenges (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006; New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2008), especially ‘General Introduction: Thinking Ethics, India and the West’, Introduction to Part A, ‘Vedas to 
the Gītā: dharma, Rites to Rights’, chapter 1, J. N. Mohanty, ‘Dharma, Imperatives and Tradition: Toward an 
Indian Theory of Moral Action’ (esp. 75–77, under ‘Law’). Also P. Bilimoria, ‘Being and Text: Dialogic 
Fecundation of Western Hermeneutics and Hindu Mīmām. sā in the Critical Era,’ in Hermeneutics and Hindu 
Thought Towards a Fusion of Horizons, ed. R. Sherma and A. Sharma (Dordrecht: Springer), 43–76. 
15. See Roger Scruton, The West and The Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (New York: Continuum, 
2002), 21; also discussed by Galanter, Law and Society. 
16. Personal communication and his review of Menski. 
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pervasive principle of justice, without needing to trace or reduce the ideal to some prior redaction of 
texts and extant scholastic formulations—though perhaps this much is arguably presupposed.17 
So what is contestable about the view we started with in the second paragraph that has unleashed the 
controversy? First let us elaborate on what exactly are the view and the claim that it underpins. It is that, 
in the first instance, the Scriptures are the source of dharma. We shall begin with the first of the 
institutes or sources that supposedly prescribes dharma, namely, the Vedas, for in principle every rule 
of dharma must indeed locate its authority in the Vedas. 
But before that a word on the conception of dharma in this juxtaposition. The common 
understanding equates dharma with duties and precepts or prescriptions. Dharma, however, is not 
simply a set of duties for it encompasses the moral law, not unlike the concept of natural law (but 
without the excessive transcendental or theological element).18  This all-embracing conception is 
derived from the root dhr., meaning ‘to form’, ‘uphold’, ‘support’, ‘sustain’ or ‘hold together’. More 
concretely, dharma may denote ‘fixed principles’, ‘order’, ‘righteousness’ and ‘truth’. It connotes the 
idea of that which maintains, gives order and cohesion to any given reality, and ultimately to nature, 
society and the individual; and it is inclusive of the respective obligations, duties including social and 
individual duties, ethical living and discharging of debts needed to ground the human community and 
allow it to flourish, etc. It would seem to follow that on the basis of this rather abstract principle Hindu 
lawmakers and ethicists devised comprehensive systems of social and moral regulations for each of the 
different groups, subgroups (caste, rulers, monarchs, etc) within the Hindu social order. Certain 
universal virtues, duties and norms also come to be specified, such as non-injury or non-violence, non-
coveting and not lying. Thus the end of dharma has to be fulfilled in terms of one’s place in society 
and in nature, supplemented with the practice of the universal norms. Mohanty sums up the broader 
reach of dharma most aptly. Thus: 
According to the Hindu tradition, dharma in the strict sense (i.e., excluding the law codes and rules of policy) 
are expressed by injunctive (prohibitive) sentences of the Vedas. The later dharmaśāstras clarify, expound and 
explain them. These injunctions embody rules that are of various sorts: they may be obligatory or occasional; 
they may pertain to one’s varn. a (rendered ‘caste’) or to one as a number of a family (kula), or they may be for 
all humans (sādhāran. a). Of many of them, it is true to say that they pertain to a person’s role and status in 
society—but this is not true of all of them: the so-called sādhāran. a or common dharmas are not so. What is 
common to them all is that they are all expressed in imperatives.19 
So far so good. But here is the rub, as we wish to argue. 
Vedamūlatva: Are Vedas the Touchstone of Hindu Law? 
The Vedas certainly ordain injunctions and moral responsibility toward performance of sacrifice 
(yajña); and rules are set down for the correct recitations and incantation of mantras accompanying this 
performative act. There are even exhortations to certain ‘alterity’ virtues, such as gift giving (dāna), 
welcoming the guest (atithi) and care for the ancestors.20 Disregarding the distinction between 
mandatory (deontological) and optional or hypothetical (consequentionalist) imperatives, the question 
arises could injunctions or imperatives possibly exhaust the scope of dharma where Dharma is to serve 
as ‘law’ and rules in matters of policy? Secondly, what we have is a seemingly motley collection of 
codes, but no attempt is made to unify them in a system or under a single moral theory, or deduce them 
from a principle. Without such a process, the function of law is not feasible. Third, they appear not to 
be grounded in matters of fact, but are rather about what ought to be the case (‘ought’ is conflated with 
‘is’ or the distinction is not clearly made).21 By and large, the ‘ought’ precepts or prescriptions seem 
                                                
17. Arthaśāstra, 1:iv; q.v. P Bilimoria, ‘Kaut.ilya’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig 
(London: Francis & Taylor, 1998), 220–22. 
18. Discussed in ‘General Introduction’, in Indian Ethics, Vol. 1. 
19. Mohanty, ‘Dharma, Imperative and Tradition’, 76. 
20. Laurie L. Patton, ‘The Fires of Strangers: A Levinasian Approach to Vedic Ethics’, in Indian Ethics, Vol. 1, 
119–47; and Maria Heim in chapter 9 in the same volume. 
21. I owe these insights to Mohanty, ‘Dharma, Imperative and Tradition’. See also Matthew Kapstein’s 
discussion in the chapter ‘Indra’s Search for the Self and the Beginnings of Philosophical Perplexity in India’, in 
his Reason’s Traces (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 53–76. 
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hardly to go beyond the immediate calling to the sacrificial pit and the eulogies to the gods. So 
understood, dharma fits uncomfortably into the rubric of law contrary to the received wisdom, 
although it may provide a ‘limit concept’ for such a legal trajectory were the society to avail itself of 
this. As Lingat also acknowledges, there is little in the way of rules of dharma in the Vedic texts. 
‘Strictly speaking, the Vedas (samhitās) do not even include a single positive precept which could be 
used directly as a rule of conduct. By contrast the brāhman. as, the āran. yakas and the upanis.ads contain 
numerous precepts which propound rules governing behaviour.’22 And as Rocher reminds us there are 
even fewer rules of law in the śruti.23 Laurie Patton too comments that ‘[A]s compendia of explicit 
statements about dharma, early Vedic texts are woefully inadequate. The Vedic world is usually placed 
low on the list of sources for Hindu ethics for similar reasons.’24 
So why does a Hindu affirm that dharma rests entirely upon the Veda? Lingat has a persuasive 
explanation, which is worth citing at some length: 
[T]he word Veda does not mean in that connection the Vedic texts, but rather the totality of Knowledge, the 
sum of all understanding, of all religious and moral truths, whether revealed or not. These truths are not human 
entities; they are imposed upon man [sic] who must simply submit to them; they exist by themselves and have 
always existed. They form a kind of code with infinite prescriptions of which only the Supreme Being can have 
perfect knowledge. The eternal code was revealed by him to certain chosen ones, and that is what is called śruti. 
But only part of that Revelation could be communicated to mankind; a good deal of it has been lost, moreover, 
due to the weakness of human memory. Therefore the Vedic texts are far from representing all the Veda. When 
a rule of dharma has no source we must conclude that it rests upon a part of the Veda which is lost or somehow 
hidden from our view. It is this hypothetical or symbolic code, rather than the surviving Vedic texts, which the 
most ancient authors, the writers of the dharmasūtras, have in mind when they proclaim that the Veda is the 
primary source of dharma. They hardly do more thereby than express their adherence to common belief, 
without attaching any particular value to that source.25 
The point is taken. Apart from the qualm one may have about the postulation of a Supreme Being 
(God) in the Vedic worldview—which the Mīmām. saka and possibly an Advaitin also will be inclined 
to vehemently take exception to—as well as the claim about the ‘lost, or hidden, Vedas’, or that even 
the Abrahmanic term ‘Revelation’ is appropriate here,26 Lingat is basically correct in his assessment 
that the Vedas are only in a perfunctory sense regarded as the inexorable foundation and source of the 
rules of dharma. Furthermore, it is because śruti has exhibited—contrary to the later smr.ti and the law 
books—a plasticity of meaning, an inexhaustible reservoir of meaning which is not exhausted by any 
system, that it enables variable interpretations and appropriation.27 Mayne was even more emphatic, 
disregarding the devotional sentiment with which Hindus look upon the Vedas as the paramount source 
of knowledge in all aspects of their lives, by declaring that the ‘Śruti, however, has little, or no, legal 
value. It contains no statements of law as such, though its statements of facts are occasionally referred 
to in the Smr
˚
̥tis and the Commentaries as conclusive evidence of a legal usage.’28 Other scholars such 
as Olivelle and Wezler reinforce the marginality of the term dharma in the Vedas, which in any case 
comes to mean something quite different in the Dharmśāstra.29 Training in the Vedas might at best 
                                                
22. Lingat, Classical Law, 8. 
23. Ludo Rocher, ‘Indian Reactions to Anglo-Hindu Law’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 92, no. 3 
(1972): 419–24. Also Ludo Rocher, ‘Hindu Conceptions of Law’, Hastings Law Journal 29, no. 6 (1978): 1293. 
24. Patton, ‘The Fires of Strangers’, 121.  
25. Lingat, Classical Law, 8. 
26. See Bilimoria, ‘The Idea of Authorless Revelation’. 
27. Mohanty, ‘Dharma, Imperatives and Tradition’, 13; while what Mohanty goes on to say may well be true to 
ethics or morality, this insight cannot be extended to dharma as law. Thus: ‘The Hindu understanding of dharma 
as embodied in the imperatives laid down in the śruti preserves the idea of ethics as rooted solidly in that tradition 
which was founded by those texts, but which those texts have permitted us to reinterpret ever anew.’ Mohanty, 
‘Dharma, Imperatives and Tradition’, 13. 
28. Cited in A. M. Bhattacharjee, Hindu Law, 15 (Mayne, Treatise, 11th edn [1953], 19, emphasis added by 
Bhattacharjee). 
29. Discussed in Donald Davis, Jr, ‘A Realist View of Hindu Law’, Ratio Juris 19, no. 3 (2006): 292, n 11, 
citing Patrick Olivelle, ‘The Semantic History of Dharma: The Middle and Late Vedic Periods’, Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 32 (2004): 491–511, and Albrecht Wezler, ‘Dharma in the Veda and the Dharmaśāstras’, Journal of 
Indian Philosophy 32, no. 5 (2004): 629–54. Curiously, Davis traces the characterisation of dharma as ‘positive 
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invest in the individual the adhikāra, that is to say, the entitlement to pronounce on the constitutive 
formalism of dharma, and thereby proffer decisions on a matter at law, without recourse necessarily to 
the substantive contents of the Vedas at the risk of transgressing the orthodoxy as well. ‘The 
theological connection of the Vedas and Hindu law is primarily a distant backdrop against which legal 
philosophy develops and the actual business of law is conducted’.30 
Reflecting here from a different quarter, the famous Lacanian political theorist Slavoj Zîzêk would 
suspiciously discern in the erstwhile discourse that underscores the Vedas as the founding source of 
Hindu law (vedamūlatva) an implicit and unstated underside. He would argue that, not unlike most 
‘mega-legal’ and superstructure discourses in other major traditions, it is a product of an ‘ideological 
fantasy’. What Zîzêk means is that each system has its own defining story in terms of its foundations 
that gets re-narrated retrospectively, even as it conceals or ‘represses’ the violence of these 
foundations; further to that, it is this ideological frame as doxa (received wisdom) that determines how 
the subject ought to interpret the laws’ frozen and forbidding letters.31 The Mīmām. sā’s ahistoricisation 
of the Vedas (through its doctrine of apūrvāpaurs.eyatva of śruti) is charged by Pollock to underpin just 
such a move, its immense contribution to the growth of Hindu jurisprudence notwithstanding (which is 
a separate philosophical function of the Mīmām. sā).32 That hermeneutic of postmodern suspicion and 
an echo of the Zîzêkian tone is certainly detectable in current scholarly dismissal of the discourse that 
is being contested here. 
Are Smṛ tis the Source? 
As described above, the smr.tis represent a variegated assortment of literary corpus whose knowledge 
base is said to have been derived from or inspired by the memory of the rules of dharma: a sort of 
consensual recollection to which Tradition commits its adherence. But this suggests at best a kind of 
temporal imaginary: long back there was this pristine and perfect knowledge about the moral order and 
rules governing the same, but we seem to have become distanced from the source; however, we are still 
able to recollect the traces and rudimentary principles for deriving rules that are incumbent upon us in 
our present situation. (It is not unlike Plato’s use of mimesis in the Theaetetus.33) The precise relation 
between śruti and smr.ti has been a matter of much scholastic debate, and we need not go into that here 
for our purposes, suffice it to say that for ‘daily practices’ (gr.hya), and in the extra-sacrificial context, 
smr.ti are no less authoritative than śruti (because smr.ti simply immemorialise the precepts already 
inscribed in the Vedas,34 or they iterate in lieu of the Vedas where the Vedas are silent). 
If we take dharmasūtras to belong to the corpus of smr.ti as well, as Manu for one would urge us to, 
then the dharmasūtras have to be taken seriously as the next likely candidate for the source of Hindu 
law. 
Robert Lingat begins with a focus on certain major dharma-sūtras, such as Baudhayāna, Āpastamba 
and Vasis.t.ha, and argues for their importance in tracing the ‘birth of law’ in Indian antiquity because of 
their reworking of the rules of ritual performance into an appreciation of dharma as ‘duty’ underlying 
all that liturgical formality. Particularly in the post-Vedic period, the ācāryas of the Brāhmanical 
schools ‘completed their teaching of rituals by speculations which brought out the moral and religious 
aspects of the rite, and explained its significance and obligations which flowed from it’.35 And so one 
finds in tandem ‘numerous rules tending to define social relationships and to regulate man’s activities 
within their group—and from this time onwards there is the appearance of something resembling 
                                                                                                                                      
law’ to the arguments of Paul Hacker, Wilhelm Halbfass and Jim Fitzgerald, in the sense that the eternal, 
transcendental—natural law-like—character of the Vedas provides empirical and historically situational 
framework for positive law (dharma/ācāra). This view is being set aside here. 
30. Davis, ‘A Realist View of Hindu Law’, 292–93. 
31. Matthew Sharpe, ‘The Philosopher’s Courtly Love? Leo Strauss, Eros, and the Law’, Law and Critique 17, 
no. 3 (2006): 357–88; see n 7 where he draws on two of Zîzêk’s works. 
32. See Bilimoria, ‘The Idea of Authorless Revelation’. 
33. Where x tells us that knowledge of the truth of 5 + 7 = 12 is not something we gain from the world (‘facts’) 
but through a recollection of what we have known in our previous celestial lives.  
34. This is the view of the Mīmām. sakas, Śabara and Kumārila. Various exegetical devices were formulated to 
make this strong connection. 
35. Lingat, Classical Law, 28. 
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legislation’.36 And this processural move clinched an emergent bond between dharma and law. The 
theories of varn. a (caste) and āśrama (stages of life) are given as examples of the ways in which the 
dharmasūtras avail themselves of a framework or two within which to lay down duties of individuals 
according to their caste and ‘station’ in life. And, of course, much energetic ink is expanded by the 
authors of these texts in reasoning through and providing justification for the hierarchical ordering of 
the caste (genea, mer-) and the diverse ‘mixed caste’ groups (jātis, to be more specific) in more 
temporal terms than upon the sacramental basis afforded in the Veda (with its tri-varn. a arrangement), 
however irrational and discriminatory this might all appear to be in hindsight. The intricacies and 
complexity of the caste system and particularly the question of its origins are matters that should not 
distract us here, but it needs to be said, as Lingat reminds us, that neither the priestly-aspiring Brahmins 
nor the authors of the sūtras ‘invented’ the caste classification, much less the system itself. They were 
confronted by a society that through various historical permutations (partly due to the contact of Ārya-
Brahmanic tradition with non-Āryan cultures) had come to be splintered and diversified into a plethora 
of groupings and racial mixtures and classes of which caste (jāti) was just one practising the most 
diverse range of customs. They needed a theory to help simplify and reduce the innumerable castes, etc. 
of their day into a more workable system: the schematics of varn. a, the four main groups known to the 
tradition, provided such a ‘handy’ conduit and prototype of the castes. Apart from codifying custom, 
their major task was to articulate the rules of living that would help secure the individual’s destiny; and 
they take care to ensure that these rules are not repugnant to dharma. Here the edict of Gautama is 
invoked: ‘The customs of countries, of caste (jāti), and of families, are equally authoritative, provided 
they are not contrary to the [sacred] texts’ [XI.20].37 Even the monarch—who is not invested with any 
power to make laws as such—is cautioned to restrain the four varn. as and take into account the customs 
of his citizens in administering law and due justice.38 It is because laws in the ancient period, as 
Altekar points out, were either sacred or secular: ‘if the former, they were based upon the sacred texts; 
if the latter, upon the customs and traditions.’39 A state that attempted to engender change in custom 
forcibly faced the danger of being overthrown. It did, however, change over time, but not by moving 
the noisy wand of legislation, but rather imperceptibly by the silent shifts within custom itself. With the 
development of administrative systems and growing complexity of society, the state assumed 
increasing onus for enacting rules and regulations, and the king could now decree administrative and 
normative ordinances which it was the duty of the subject to obey at the risk of being questioned or 
arrested by order of the royal court. But still these powers were not as extensive and enforceable as 
those of the modern power of legislation. 
The other mark of the linking of law to the margins of dharma in the dharma-sūtra period is their 
move toward furnishing principles for determining punishments and penalties for a range of 
misdemeanors. A separation is made between religious and penal sanctions (although the language 
continues to be one of ‘expiation of sin’ upon undergoing the decreed punishment, etc.). The process is 
rather secular; the rules of procedure, however, appear not to have made a clear distinction between the 
civil and criminal, except in areas such as the admission of witnesses and whose counsel the king 
should take before making a decision on the case before him. Their preoccupation is mostly with 
family (marriage, in particular) and succession law. 
Coming to the dharmaśāstras proper, proximately attached to smr.ti as to the dharmasūtras,40 we 
find that they are more extensive, expansive in scope and mandate a much larger role to rules of a 
judicial character, which bring them close to the ‘legislative’ function.41 The methodically classified 
rules in the dharmaśāstras are intended to guide the king in his sovereign functions as well as to assist 
in the administration of justice. ‘There we find a branch of science of dharma which is tending to 
disengage itself from others [notably the ritual predilections of the Veda], and to be envisaged as an 
                                                
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid., 38. 
38. Ibid., and Mohanty, ‘Dharma, Imperatives and Tradition’. 
39. A. S. Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India (Banaras: Motilal Banarsidass, 1949), 110.  
40. The distinction is not so clear-cut, and the dharmaśāstras in some accounts encompass the sūtras, since both 
are concerned with discipline in dharma. 
41. Lingat, Classical Law, 73. 
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autonomous discipline.’42 The preeminent authority is enjoyed by the oldest among these, namely, 
Manu, Kaut.ilya, Yājñavalkya and Nārada; the commentaries on these continue into the ninth century 
CE. The Mānava-dharmaśāstras (ca second century CE) is perhaps the most celebrated among these, 
but equally infamous in view of its excessive bias towards the Brahmanic and ruling elites and its 
oppressive injunctions in respect of women and the śūdras, who are considered in much of the 
dharmaśāstras to belong to the lower rungs of the caste hierarchy. The rules and regulations that Manu 
tries to embrace comprise many ‘paths’ (mārgas) that people live by in their private and public lives, 
be that of relation between partners, commercial transactions, disputes related to property and 
disposition towards animals as well as inhabitants and rulers in neighbouring territories. And a caveat 
was issued, namely that of janaganamana: scripturally sanctioned acts are to be set aside if they appear 
to be offensive or abhorrent to the people; whereas Kātyāyana decreed that the accepted customs of a 
country should not run counter to the rules of śruti and smr.ti and that customs repugnant to reason 
should be abolished forthwith (Śrauta-sūtra, III.7; 42); and Nārada would agree that unreasonable laws 
should be reformed (Nāradasmr.ti, XVIII.9). 
Likewise, if one looks at the Arthaśāstra, there Kaut.ilya (ca 321–296 BCE) is quite conscious of the 
diversity from ancient days of the Indian regions and accordingly allows for a degree of flexibility in 
matters of law and justice (dharmasthya). Kaut.ilya, at a superficial reading, appears to justify the rigid 
reign of the ‘rod’ (dan. d. a) wielded by the king. One plausible ground for this edict is that, unless there 
are calculated controls, the (natural) law of the small fish being swallowed by the big fish would 
prevail. Jurisprudence, ordinances for regulating civil life and the governance and security of the state 
are the monarch’s chief objectives.43 Indeed, the king is expected to attend each morning to pleas and 
petitions from subjects who may come from all walks of life and different caste or subregional groups, 
including women, the sick, aged and handicapped. When meting out justice, the king or the state is not 
in a position to make laws; rather the sovereign court’s jurisdiction is to negotiate between dharma 
(law), custom or settled community law (vyavahāra), transactions or commercial and personal 
practices and written edicts (śāstras). The king may overrule the latter two sources of law, but he 
cannot put himself above dharma, in accordance with which all instances of disputes and contradictory 
judgments are to be decided (3.1.40–44). This precept entails that the king maintains detailed codes of 
law and precedents and judges each case by its merit or otherwise in law, and he metes out punishment 
proportionate to the offence of violation of the codes, but not in whimsical excess. His ministers 
(amātyas or mantrins), the purohita, the ascetics, even the queen and prince, the gods and above all 
dharma maintain a check and are witness to any possible deviation.44 Kaut.ilya is also credited with 
having been among the first to set down codes of law (which comes close to the secular codification 
towards which Hindu Code Bills have been moving this century), as distinct from re-inscripting 
desirable prescriptions and diverse customary rules, regardless of their moral or philosophical merits, 
etc. 
 Thus law compilers such as Manu and Kaut.ilya bring the notion of dharma down to earth, as it were, 
by devising a comprehensive system of social and moral regulations for each of the different groups, 
sub-groups (caste, rulers, etc.) within the Hindu social system, as well as specifying certain universal 
duties incumbent on all. Vocational niches, duties, norms and even punishments are differently 
arranged for different groups, and the roles and requirements also vary in the different āśrama stages 
for the different groups. Before the advent of the śāstras (Artha- Dharma- and the Smr.tis) these 
normative tracts, or law if you will, were preserved in the respective customs of the groups and in the 
cumulative tradition. Dharmaśāstra describe them as samayācārika dharmas, customary rules. The law 
                                                
42. Ibid. 
43. P. V. Kane, Dharmaśāstra ka itihāsa (Lakhanaū: Uttara Pradeśa Hindī Sam. sthāna Hindī Samiti Prabhāga, 1969–
1975), 1:225; Kaut.ilya’s Arthaśāstra, trans. R. Shamasastry (Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing 
House,1960); R. P. Kangle, The Kaut.iliya Arthaśāstra (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1922), Part 2; see also 
Bilimoria, ‘The Idea of Authorless Revelation’.  
44. The king’s obligation to administer justice in accordance with the principles of legal science 
(dharmaśāstrānusāren. a; also in Manu’s Code of Law, VII.128) is the very first verse on injunction in the Second 
Book (on vyavahāra, translated here as ‘positive law’) in Yājñavalkyasmr.ti reinforced in the commentary Mitāks.
arā. Yājñavalkya maintains that ‘a custom which is not opposed to law should be carefully maintained, as also the 
precedent established by the king’s judgments. The learned that assist the king should be versed in the scriptures 
and study Mīmām. sā, knowing dharma (religion) as well, and dispassionate toward friends and foes alike.’ 
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courts under the control of the chief justice (prād. vivāka) were responsible for administering such of 
these rules as pertained to family and social life and personal laws, and created civil and criminal rights, 
which were enforceable. In time, particularly varn.āśrama or caste rules and rules of personal and 
family law were inscribed into the Smr.tis in which the chief justice therefore had to be well versed.45 
Guided by these rules the judges (dharmādhyaks.as, nyāyakaran. ikas) sitting in these civil courts 
enforced jātidharma (sub-caste rules), śren. īdharma (by-laws of guilds), kuladharma (family traditions) 
and deśadharma (customs of the country, or jānapadadharma, as well as svadharma (cf. Manu I.118 
and VIII.14) insofar as they engendered civil and legal rights which may have come under dispute or 
contestation. Liberal allowances were made for changes in the civil, criminal and customary law, as 
sanctioned by popular usage and moulded by state guilds. Altekar goes on to observe that ‘[I]t was the 
duty of one of the ministers, viz the pan. d. ita [the minister in charge of religion and morality], to find out 
which practices had become antiquated and to discourage and not enforce them. He was also to advise 
the government about suitable changes that could be introduced in consonance with the spirit of 
dharma and culture.’ 46  Dharma, whether understood as morality, i.e. normative practices and 
customary rules, or as law (administered by the king and the courts), was never a static, stagnant pond 
that could not be moved by appeal to conscience (ātmatus.t.i), conciliation (sāma), appeasement (dāma), 
difference and dissension (bheda), or shifts in the self-understanding of the tradition, or variations 
between groups and regions.47 The spirit of the prevailing dharma and culture more often than not 
dictated the terms of reference of legal deliberations as well as their inscription and re-thinking in 
matters of policy. And yet a critically informed genealogy of this process is lacking in the 
reconstruction of Indian legal history. So where does one turn for a more informed and definitive 
mapping? 
P. V. Kane’s monumental work the History of Dharmaśāstras has been deemed by scholars to be 
unhelpful on this problematic as also on the sorts of questions I have been addressing in this paper.48 
Rajeev Dhavan complains that Kane’s gigantic work failed to develop sociological insights into the 
development of Hindu law and questions his motive of wishing to raise the stakes of classical India’s 
jurisprudence on a par with that of any system that may bear comparison.49 But to his immense credit, 
Kane has provided an unsurpassable compendia of the wide-ranging textual tapestry, records of 
codification and the internal (inter-textual as well) śāstric reasoning and disputes that informed the 
moral, social and juridical reiteration of the extant normative structures of the society of those times. 
The śāstras were making every attempt to hold together an otherwise self-regulating social order that 
periodically came under threat of fissure and challenges due to its sheer diversity and changes that 
historians are only too well aware of. Kane looks, albeit uncritically, for sanguine intentions in the 
śāstras and their defined purpose of bringing happiness to the members of the society who submit to 
the governance of their edicts and regulative norms. 
Likewise, underscoring the ‘purposive approach’ as against the ‘literal approach’ (in modern 
jurisprudence), A. M. Bhattacharjee suggests that the dharmaśāstras realised that unless one performs 
one’s duties there can be no protection for corresponding rights vested in another; thus if everyone 
performs his rightful obligations, ‘the rights of everyone else would also be secured thereby and that 
without any acrimony of friction.’50 
For all its apparent effort to distance itself from the overwhelming religious and ritual imperatives of 
the earlier Vedic worldview, and instill a more juridical character to the rules, the collective spirit of 
the dharmaśāstras are never too far off from that soteriological and cosmic end to which the Scriptural 
tradition harkens back, time and again. The king likewise is all too conscious of the risk of committing 
sin or de-merit if he applies a rule improperly. Juridical consequences aside, the institution of marriage 
too is fraught with warnings about the dangers of slighting a god if one marries into a wrong or 
forbidden caste and fails to fulfil the obligations (ritual, family and social) incumbent upon the 
                                                
45. Altekar, State and Government, 151–53. 
46. Ibid., 124. 
47. Ibid., 123. 
48. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, 5v. (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Institut, 1962–1996), 3: 21–26, 51. 
49. Rajeev Dhavan, ‘Dharmasastra and Modern Indian Society: A Preliminary Exploration’, Journal of the 
Indian Law Institute 34, no. 4 (1992): 518. 
50. Bhattacharjee, Hindu Law, 6. 
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householder. If the regulation is ‘sacred’ in its originary character, then the law expressed by that rule 
is vyāvahākarika (worldly, profane) only in a derivative sense. 
So this leads even one such as Lingat who tried to anchor the origins of Hindu law in the (dharma-
)śāstras to pause and wonder ‘in what measure the rules of law, which we meet in the dharma-
śāstras—presuming that they do really belong to dharma—actually express juridical solutions[?]. They 
are enunciated in order that spiritual merit may be gained or secured. It is unquestionably a religious 
duty to conform to them, and in this respect they are certainly amongst the origins of law.’ Given that 
legal sources would comprise, at the least, codified rules, legislation, precedent, custom and agreement 
or equity, this then is the critical question: 
But what is their [the śāstras] exact significance? Are they the direct sources of law (fons juris), i.e., have they 
quality of legislation, the authority of which bears directly upon the judge? Or are they sources of law only in 
the sense that religion and morality and prudence are amongst the sources of law in Europe—that is, have they 
managed to exert an influence upon the law development of social institutions as an historical or explanatory 
cause of law rather than a true source?51 
Lingat does not really provide a decisive answer to his own quandary. For a somewhat different 
perspective or approach to this question it is time to turn elsewhere. First, a qualification from A. M. 
Bhattacharjee may pave the way for this direction. Bhattacharjee rejects the views of Mayne, Mulla, 
Derrett and others and argues instead that well before the arrival of the British in India 
. . . the Śrutis and the Smṛ ̥tis ceased to be the principal sources of Hindu Law having been replaced by the 
Nibandha, i.e. the Commentaries and Digests[,] and it was not at all necessary or even permissible to enquire as 
to whether a particular principle of law enunciated in the Nibandha was in fact supported by the Smṛ ̥tis and it 
was binding without their support and even in spite of their contrary mandate.52 
Hence, Bhattacharjee sets aside the lex scripta of smr.ti also as a viable source, or even one amongst the 
sources, of Hindu law. But whether he is right in turning our gaze almost exclusively toward the 
nibandhas may itself be open to question, for the bulk of evidence that Bhattacharjee brings to his own 
contentions is based on the proceedings of the Privy Council, from as far back as 1868, where the 
judges deferred to the Commentaries (most especially the Mitāks.arā) prevalent in a particular province 
as the authority that has been given due recognition and not any other texts.53 Nevertheless, what is 
common to both the smr.ti texts and the nibhandas or Commentaries and Digests is that they are records 
of usages and customs commonly accepted by the people. While smr.ti recorded these as imperative 
precepts without elucidating reasons for their justification (except for the desirable practices of more 
recent origin which awaited acceptance by society), the smr.tikāras (commentators on smr.ti) and the 
nibandhas (Digests) are more forthcoming in explaining, consolidating, modifying and even enlarging 
their rules in actual usage and customs then prevalent among the different groups, often with utter 
disregard for the totalising rules in the smr.ti itself.54 This is tension that has inflected itself to the 
present-day debate on the basis of the authority of personal law and the codification of Hindu law in 
the statutory Acts of 1955–56. 
Menski’s Forays 
Menski begins by rejecting three suppositions that have bedeviled much of modern scholarship on the 
question of Hindu law. First of these is that ancient Indians did not have anything that we would 
nowadays recognise as ‘law’. For if indeed all human societies have law, ‘why should ancient Hindus 
be any different?’55 This retort may not cut much ice. H. L. A. Hart (whose lectures the present author 
                                                
51. Lingat, Classical Law, 136. 
52. Bhattacharjee, Hindu Law, 13. 
53. Menski takes up Paras Diwan and Peeyushi Diwan [Modern Hindu Law: Codified and Uncodified, 9th edn 
(Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency, 1993), 39] and Satyajeet A. Desai [Mulla’s Principles, 59] for exactly the 
same over-determination. Menski, Hindu Law, 147.  
54. Derrett also notes this; cited in Bhattacharjee, Hindu Law, 36. 
55. Werner F. Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 43. 
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once had the privilege of attending at a law school) for one might relegate Hindu law under the rubric 
of those ‘primitive societies’ whose ‘laws’ or customary ways bear no comparison to either the natural 
law tradition or positive law as it has evolved in the past few centuries in the modern West.56 
Nevertheless, Menski questions, on the one hand, the classical positivist theories and Austinian notions 
of formalistic, state-made ‘rule of law’ (or positive law as command of the sovereign) or Western 
‘model jurisprudence’, as the only ways to conceive of law, and on the other hand what he calls ‘the 
loaded assumption of the basic “revelation” of Hindu law from some divine authority.’57 His simple 
answer is that ‘the ancient Hindus conceived of law differently from Western cultures.’ Hindu law for 
him ‘represents a culture-specific form of natural law. In that sense, too, it is an ancient chthonic legal 
system.’58 Menski’s strategy is to underscore the traditional relativity of dharma—what scholars find 
in the notion of adhikāra-bheda59—and its constant emphasis on situational specificity, which allows 
for difference in accordance with circumstances. To that end he dismisses the representation of Hindu 
law by fundamentalist Hindutva types and by Orientalists who believe that, for example, Manu had the 
last word on Hindu law! Rather, he argues that Hindu law is a branch of dharma but that its contours 
cannot be reconstructed from mere textual sources, much less the śruti and smr.tis.60 This was the 
mistake made by European Orientalist scholars and an emerging literate Hindu elite, who, while 
welcoming the recognition of their moral system as embedding a ‘legal’ process, were blinded by the 
equation of dharma with law, which in fact ‘secularised the understanding of Hindu legal processes 
and marginalised the inherent link of all individual actions with the “cosmic” system of righteousness 
as the ultimate arbiter of what was “the right thing to do” at any given moment.’61 (Menski is referring 
to the r.ta/dharma complex embodied in the concept of the macrocosmic order as the ‘the higher power’ 
and therefore the foreground for any discourse to ensue on human ends and positive human rule 
making.) The British administrators and judges missed seeing the connection and thus exacerbated this 
process in the reconstruction of Anglo–Hindu law. 
 The story that Menski provides is a rather complicated, and in some ways convoluted, one, as it 
moves through various stages, each stage accounting for the peculiarity of its handling and 
development of Hindu law as it shuttles through the lanes and by-ways of history. While rejecting the 
prominent view that we began with—which all too readily locates the source of Hindu law in śruti, smr.
ti and sadācāra—he takes as his own starting point for pre-classical law the Vedic concept (though not 
necessarily the written word) of cosmic order (r.ta) which metamorphosed into dharma (microcosmic 
order or duty). Similarly, when he turns attention to the next phase of the development of Hindu law—
the classical period which is marked by the dharmaśāstras, or smr.ti more generally (along with the 
commentaries and digests)—he is less interested in what the texts have to say than in the broader 
anthropology of the differently nuanced and lived realities and people’s customs and local ways of 
doing things that enabled Hindus to negotiate, modify and retain control over their religious, moral and 
legal processes. The four stages of development within ‘traditional’ Hindu law is summarised by 
Menski in his own words, starting from the macrocosmic universal order system (r.ta) of the pre-
classical Vedic age: 
This gradually metamorphosed (but we do not quite know when) into properly ‘classical’ Hindu law, the 
idealised system of self-controlled order (dharma), focused on microcosmic order and encompassing every 
Hindu individual. Third, because of the admitted limits of self-controlled order, we soon find the deterrence-
based stage of punishment (dan. d. a), which is a typically Hindu form of ‘assisted self-control,’ still relying on 
the individual’s sense of dharma, but now explicitly recognizing that some external pressure is necessary to 
                                                
56. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961), 20. 
57. Menski, Hindu Law, 44. 
58. Ibid. Menski rejects all theological definitions that dwell on the law being something revealed, presumably 
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ensure that cosmic order is being maintained as much as possible. Here we find evidence of greater importance 
given to the Hindu ruler (rāja) who operates at various levels, from head of family to clan chief, village head, 
and real King. Fourth, the more or less formal methods of negotiation or dispute processing (vyavahāra) should 
also be counted as a separate stage of Hindu legal development now recognizing the scope for formal 
settlement of contested matters, which may culminate in a royal pronouncement as some kind of final word. A 
Hindu royal edict does not represent positive law, but constitutes a visible manifestation of the superiority of 
the r.ta/dharma complex, according to which the Hindu ruler is supposed to position himself and his activities.62 
If there are texts that are aligned to these shifts and changes, and present accounts of the same rather 
than deviate into some abstractions of their own (possibly for elite consumption), then Menski is all too 
happy to consider their wisdom, as when he turns to a claim made by some scholars that the Mitāks.arā 
(probably the most extensive commentary on the Yājñavalkyasmr.ti) marks the fountainhead of the 
secularisation of Hindu law. 
Summing up this discussion of ancient Hindu law, when all is said and done, the śāstras have not 
been able to survive, sustain and flourish as anchoring Hindu law simpliciter in as authoritative a 
manner as believed, and certainly not effectively into the modern century, as indeed the turmoil 
experienced in the area of family law since 1955 manifests.63 The unreformed Hindu law has proved 
resistant to change in the area least imagined, not unlike Islamic and Jewish law. The nineteenth 
century evinced some remnants of śāstric law in penal and contract laws, but not as effectively applied 
in respect of civil law, and the courts experienced difficulties in discerning the correct rules and 
application of śāstric codes. In their quest for uniformity and certainty the British administrators gave 
vent to the śāstrīs (especially of Bengal) to re-fashion the formerly (per)suasive authority as self-
consciously normative and positive law of the Hindus. But in effect, as time would tell, it wasn’t so 
much that Hindu law was being restructured, but rather that aspects of modern law that were 
considered germane to a civil society, such as (for our purposes) family law, were being reformulated 
along traditional Hindu lines: there lies the difference. That dialectic and the tensions therein is neither 
a curse nor a gift of the modern (or postmodern), as Derrett, cited approvingly by Menski, points out: 
In tackling Hindu law the first thing to remember is the tension between the past and present, the desire to be 
traditional and the desire to be up-to-date. It is too readily forgotten that the tensions to which we allude were 
present centuries ago, though not always in the same form, and the conflict between ‘foreign’ manners and 
ancient ways is endemic in India and has been going on since the Vedic age. Far too few critics of the present 
order realise that their ancestors were engaged in corresponding if not actually similar complaints centuries 
ago.64 
Hence, again in Derrett’s astute words, ‘[H]istorians of law are at a disadvantage in that neither the smr.
tis, nor digests or commentaries, undertake to give a full picture of law-in-action, since their work—as 
that of Kane’s—is devoid of anthropological or sociological awareness.’65 Hindu law is then a 
textualised form of customary law, dispensed by religious elders in interaction with royal rulers, from 
what have earlier been established customs in that society, built up through precedents, digests of 
rulings and intellectual re-workings, such as those of Kaut.ilya and to an extent Manu. This is not unlike 
the common law tradition that developed over a number of centuries in Britain, which is one reason 
why the British legates in the nineteenth century could recognise elements of their own system of law 
in Hindu law, but were overwhelmed by the diversity of practices—customs as well as jurisprudence—
and representations across Hindu society in the subcontinent. 
Nevertheless, a Mīmām. saka cannot fully countenance the suggestion that Indian jurisprudence itself, 
particularly during the medieval period, had no deep connections with the textual or scholastic tradition. 
The Mīmām. sā has had a long history of influence precisely via its interpretative intervention—for this 
is the reasoning skill the Mīmām. sakas brought from their ritual hermeneutics to resolve apparently 
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conflicting injunctions or other textual prescription on the performance of yajñas or sacrifices.66 Their 
source is mostly the Brāhman. as. Scholastic forays have therefore always inflected themselves in what 
could be regarded as the domain of customary law. In a similar vein, the jurisprudence of Dharmaśāstra 
recognises that all rules of dharma, at the more abstract level, are derived from the Vedas; however, in 
the more practical context another discourse adverting to ‘the related concepts of ācāra, caritra, 
maryādā, samaya, sam˙vid, etc. all referring to rules of a particular locality, community, merchant 
group, etc.,’ come into focus.67 Donald R. Davis, Jr, demonstrates through the use of the concept of 
paribhās.ā, technical or supplementary law that reflects and shapes the discourses (including the ‘meta-
discourse’ of the Dharmaśāstra) and ‘actual practices of community or group rules in great variety of 
local contexts.’68 These conventional rules refine rather than revise rules of the śāstra: they specify 
how primary rules of Dharmaśāstra will or will not apply to a particular group’s legal affairs; and they 
provide a device by means of which two rules of recognition can be legally reconciled, even as they 
continue to function in largely separate domains.69 Through a long and complicated analysis that 
involves recourse to medieval (including South Indian digests of Dharmaśāstra, such as Smr. ̥ticandrika 
(SC) of Devannabhat.t.a), contemporaneous inscriptional and epigraphical sources and commentaries, 
Davis develops what he calls a ‘realist theory of Hindu law’, which exudes strong elements of positive 
law (in H. L. A. Hart’s non-Austinian sense) precisely through the pāribhās.ic-explanatory gloss, or 
reconciliatory stratagem, on legislated dharma 70  (where conflict between rules might arise, or 
conventions are violated, or the śāstras remain silent) that cumulates towards Hindu jurisprudence, and 
which is also mitigated by the prevailing discourses of theology, philosophy and politics even as the 
winds of change sweep through social and political realities. In another forceful submission, lamenting 
that the ‘legal side of Hindu dharma has been lost’ (which echoes my own lament in regard to the 
legal-jurisprudential side of the Mīmām. sā), Davis has gone as far as to suggest that Hinduism at large 
could be viewed as ‘a Legal Tradition’; that its theology (perhaps we might correct this to 
‘metaphysic’) lends itself in more ways than one to the extraction of a robust legal ideology.71 Of 
course, some of us have been deeply concerned to free perceptions of Hinduism as a religion overlaid 
with rituals, mythologies, sexo-tantric indulgences and other remnants of Orientalist biases, and argue 
instead for its deeply ethical or moral philosophical basis (as those familiar with the project Indian 
Ethics: Classical and Contemporary Challenges would be aware72). Law and ethics are intricately 
connected, as in Islamic Law—and Davis has indeed acknowledged as much: 
A relationship of connection and semantic concomitance exists between dharma and law, and not merely a 
relationship of encompassment, in which dharma equals law plus religion plus morality, each of the 
subcategories isolatable from the other. In this way, law is not merely an isolatable subset of dharma in 
Dharmaśāstra, but rather an integral and essential part of all dharma, even when part of the point of invoking 
dharma is to remake it along new theological lines.73 
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Davis, unlike his Indological counterparts, comes to his own novel theory not from a scholarly concern 
as such with Dharmaśāstra texts specializing in a scholarly theology as from his substantive quest for a 
concept of Hindu law in or through the texts.74 
So our respective projects could be seen as complementary rather than at odds; either way, the 
immense intellectual fabric of the Hindu tradition, and its intermingling discourses of morality and 
prudence and ethics that finds a common denominator or connecting link in the limit concept of 
dharma, represented in the texts from the Upanis.ads to Yājñavalkyasmr.ti to various redactions in the 
Dharmaśāstras, cannot be more forcefully underscored. On the legal side, Davis approaches the thesis 
he puts forward through a deep exploration of the scholastic nuances of dharma, which he argues 
yields—besides its earlier ritualistic rules (vidhi, codanā)—empirical sources for rules that differentiate 
ordinary acts (karma) from legal acts (karan. atva, itikartavyatā), and the ‘means for effecting’ the same 
(kārakahetu). And this is the argument: 
The concern for correct or proper procedure also takes into account the inevitability of mistakes, intentional or 
not, that might nullify a mortgage, unfairly distribute an inheritance, or make an ancestral rite ineffective. 
Dharma in Dharmaśāstra provides for both punishment (dan. d. a) and penances (prāyaścitta) that ameliorate or 
rectify legal mistakes or transgressions. Punishment and penance, although conceptually distinct, nevertheless 
overlap in, for example, descriptions of thieves begging rulers for punishment (as a form of penance) or judges 
declaring both a punishment and a penance for adultery (Jolly 1928: 263–267).75 
Davis’ is a refreshingly new voice in the debate and I believe, until shown otherwise by critics, it is 
rather more persuasive than any of the views considered above, and it supplements—some significant 
qualifications notwithstanding and incorporation of certain of Derrett, Lingat and Menski’s invaluable 
insights—the position towards which I have been moving in this paper, which I summarise now. 
Pivotal to the emergence of a new theory of Hindu law is a careful review of methodological shifts 
in approaching the Dharmaśāstra texts and the historiography of law in India; pari pasu this desiderata 
can be extended to and applied to the whole debate over the textual sources versus non-textual 
residually local customs and practices as the basis of Hindu law. The emergent theory eschews the 
historiography of law that relies heavily, on the one hand, on technical, often overly legalistic, readings 
of Dharmaśāstra and, on the other hand, on supposed village customs bequeathed for court records by 
British officials during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There is a middle or 
intermediate ground that remains unexamined in the study of Hindu law, but for the passing 
acknowledgements of the validity of rules governing corporate associations in the Dharmaśāstra. What 
the corporate conventions in the Smr.ticandrika provide are a standardised digest of śāstric ideas 
regarding this title of law. But a further argument can be made that in medieval India the rules of 
Dharmaśāstra influenced levels of law from the regional and community-based conventions to special 
localised standards. 
However, the task of teasing out the various levels is hampered by the lack of adequate historical 
data and deficiencies in the available materials for study. Nevertheless, invoking a phrase introduced in 
this discourse by Olivelle,76 Dharmaśāstra could be said to be a ‘meta-discourse’ (what Derrida 
elsewhere has called the ‘meta-narrative’ of the Force of Law). While the Dharmaśāstras contain some 
legal codes, they are nowhere near what we in modern times understand as ‘legislations’ or legalistic 
regulative statutes or episteme of substantive law; rather the śāstras are predominantly manuals utilised 
in the training on the operative dimensions of legal discourse, and in the dissemination of helpful 
resources or what Davis terms ‘theologically motivated jurisprudence’.77 As we have observed in the 
various critiques offered in this paper, dharma was understood as substantive law when it relied for its 
sources on local culture (certain preeminent customary practices), alongside the normative ethos of 
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good people (sadācārā) and the voice of conscience of Dasein (authentic personal being), rather than 
on some transcendent Divine Being (atmatus.t.i). 
